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Playing Fair: Why the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency’s Performance-Enhanced Adjudications 
Should Be Treated as State Action 
Paul C. McCaffrey* 
INTRODUCTION 
The continued vitality of the Olympic Games indicates that 
society finds some intrinsic value in athletic competition.1 “This 
intrinsic value often is referred to as ‘the spirit of sport,’”2 and it 
combines ethical notions of fairness and a level playing field with 
excellence in athletic performance.3 Undeniably, this idealized notion 
of competition is played out by thousands on the Olympic stage. 
Equally irrefutable, however, is the long-standing use of artificial 
substances to enhance natural athletic abilities.4 The illicit use of 
performance-enhancing substances—commonly referred to as 
“doping”—is irreconcilable with the spirit of sport.5  
 
 * J.D. (2006), Washington University in St. Louis School of Law. 
 1. Athens, Greece recently hosted the XXVIII Olympiad. See Athens 2004 Olympic 
Games, http://www.athens2004.com (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). Over 11,000 athletes 
represented 202 countries during the seventeen-day competition. Id. An estimated four billion 
viewers from around the world watched on television or in person. Id. 
 2. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE 3 (2003) [hereinafter 
WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE], available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/code 
_v3.pdf. 
 3. The “spirit of sport” involves, inter alia, ethics, health, excellence in performance, 
teamwork, dedication, and respect for other participants. Id. 
 4. “Ancient Greek athletes are known to have used special diets and stimulating potions 
to fortify themselves.” World Anti-Doping Agency, A Brief History of Anti-Doping, 
http://www.wada-ama.org/ (follow “About WADA” hyperlink; then follow “History” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). “Strychnine, caffeine, cocaine, and alcohol were often 
used by cyclists and other endurance athletes in the 19th century.” Id. “Thomas Hicks ran to 
victory in the Olympic marathon of 1904 in Saint Louis with the aid of raw egg, injections of 
strychnine, and doses of brandy administered to him during the race!” Id. 
 5. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Unfortunately, regulators struggle to keep pace with the increasing 
levels of sophistication at which doping is conducted.6 Until very 
recently, the scientific difficulties were compounded by inconsistent 
anti-doping controls and political struggles among various 
international and national sports organizations.7 International 
criticism has been focused on American athletes and the United 
States Olympic Committee (USOC),8 which has been suspected of 
sanctioning the drug abuse.9  
In response to such problems, the World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) was established in 1999,10 with the goal of creating a 
doping-free sports culture through research, education, and 
sanctioning.11 WADA formally introduced its World Anti-Doping 
Code (“the Code”) in March 2003.12 The Code attempts to harmonize 
 
 6. See Lisa Jarvis, Comment, Should the International Olympic Committee Be Policing 
Motherhood? Constitutional Implications of Regulating Pregnancy and the Abortion-Doping 
Scheme Under Domestic Law, 13 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 297, 299 (2003). 
 7. See Michael S. Straubel, Doping Due Process: A Critique of the Doping Control 
Process in International Sport, 106 DICK. L. REV. 523, 525–31 (2002) (reviewing several “sad 
examples of the Byzantine and dysfunctional world of anti-doping control before the 2000 
Olympic Games”). Two United States cases, Slaney v. International Amateur Athletic 
Federation, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001), and Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic 
Federation, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994), are illustrative and are discussed infra Part I.A. 
 8. Terry Madden, current CEO of the United States Anti-Doping Agency, stated: “‘[T]he 
international perception of America’s athletes was that America’s athletes were the biggest 
cheaters in the world . . . the international perception was that we were dirty.’” Anne Benedetti 
& Jim Bunting, There’s a New Sheriff in Town: A Review of the United States Anti-Doping 
Agency, INT’L SPORTS L. REV., May 2003, at 19, 20. 
 9. This suspicion appears justified. A doctor formerly associated with the USOC doping 
control program “released documents showing that between 1988 and 2000, over 100 US 
Olympic athletes tested positive for prohibited substances, but were subsequently cleared by 
internal US appeals process without” public comment. Id. at 20. Moreover, “at least 18 US 
athletes tested positive . . . at the US Olympic trials and went on to compete in the Olympic 
Games after being exonerated by the US internal appeal process.” Id. 
 10. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) convened the World Conference on 
Doping in Sport in February 1999. See World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA History, 
http://www.wada-ama.org/ (follow “About WADA” hyperlink; then follow “History” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 7, 2006). WADA was established in November 1999 as an 
independent organization “under the initiative of the IOC with the support and participation of 
intergovernmental organizations, governments, public authorities, and other public and private 
bodies fighting against doping in sport.” Id. 
 11. World Anti-Doping Agency, Mission, http://www.wada-ama.org/ (follow “About 
WADA” hyperlink; then follow “Mission” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2006). 
 12. See World Anti-Doping Agency, Q&A on the Code, http://www.wada-ama.org/ 
(follow “World Anti-Doping Code” hyperlink; then follow “What is the Code” hyperlink; then 
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anti-doping regulations across all sports and countries.13 Many 
governments and sports organizations formally accepted the Code at 
an international conference on doping in 2003;14 these signatories 
include the United States of America, the USOC, and the United 
States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA).15 Signatories were required to 
bring their anti-doping policies into compliance with the mandatory 
articles of the Code prior to the Summer Olympic Games in Athens, 
Greece.16 Accordingly, the USOC and the USADA revised their anti-
doping policies and adopted verbatim the Code’s mandatory 
articles.17  
One of these articles specified the standard of proof to be used in 
doping adjudications.18 Under this article, the anti-doping agency 
must establish a violation of a doping rule “to the comfortable 
satisfaction of the hearing body.”19 Prior to the Code’s enactment a 
number of anti-doping organizations, including the USADA, applied 
the standard of proof used in United States criminal courts—beyond a 
reasonable doubt.20  
 
follow “Q&A on the Code” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) [hereinafter WADA, Q&A on 
the Code]. 
 13. Id. The Code’s two purposes are “[t]o protect the Athlete’s fundamental right to 
participate in doping-free sport and thus promote health, fairness and equality . . . and [t]o 
ensure harmonized, coordinated and effective anti-doping programs at the international and 
national level . . . .” WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 1. 
 14. See WADA, Q&A on the Code, supra note 12. 
 15. An updated list of signatories is available at Code Acceptance, http://www.wada-
ama.org/ (follow “World Anti-Doping Code” hyperlink; then follow “Code Acceptance” 
hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 8, 2006). 
 16. See WADA, Q&A on the Code, supra note 12. 
 17. See U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., NATIONAL ANTI-DOPING POLICIES (2004), http://www. 
usoc.org/National_Anti-Doping_Poliicies_August_13_04.pdf. 
 18. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 12. 
 19. Id. Article 3.1 of the Code, entitled Burdens and Standards of Proof, states: 
The Anti-Doping Organization shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-
doping rule violation has occurred. The standard of proof shall be whether the Anti-
Doping Organization has established an anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable 
satisfaction of the hearing body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation 
which is made. This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of 
probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Id. (third emphasis added). 
 20. See Rob Gloster, USADA Changes Burden of Proof in Athletes’ Cases, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, June 13, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/athens/track/ 
2004-06-13-jones-usada-burden_x.htm. The change is documented in two widely publicized 
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The change was not well received within the athletic community, 
particularly amongst those competing in track and field events.21 
Sprinter Marion Jones, under investigation by the USADA, called the 
agency a “secret kangaroo court,”22 and threatened to sue should she 
be barred from competition “because of a hunch.”23 While Jones has 
not found it necessary to make good on her promise (yet), others in 
the field of sports law predict that the lower burden of proof will be 
challenged by athletes in the courts.24 
The dissatisfaction is attributable in part to the similarities 
between criminal proceedings and doping adjudications.25 Indeed, an 
athlete might argue that constitutional due process demands the 
protection of the reasonable doubt standard of proof. However, the 
litigious athlete must clear a number of hurdles before claiming 
victory on this basis.26 One such barrier is the state action doctrine. 
For due process protections to apply, the athlete must show that the 
USADA is a state actor, and that its proceedings are not merely 
private conduct.27 Despite a prior Supreme Court holding that the 
USOC is not a state actor,28 the premise of this Note is that current 
USADA doping adjudications using the “comfortable satisfaction” 
standard of proof may fairly be characterized as state action. 
Part I of this Note describes the creation of the USADA, its 
current adjudication process, and the similarities between this process 
and the American criminal justice system. 
 
memos from Travis Tygart, USADA’s Director of Legal Affairs. Id. Tygart wrote: “Application 
of the ‘comfortable satisfaction’ standard is in the interest of justice because it is the standard of 
proof set forth in the World Anti-Doping Code . . . [which] most appropriately balance[s] the 
rights of clean athletes and fair sport against the interests of the accused.” Id. 
 21. See Linda Robertson, A Sport Comes Clean, MIAMI HERALD, July 18, 2004, at C8 
(describing the track and field community’s negative reaction to the change). 
 22. Amy Shipley, BALCO Tab Runs High for Agency, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2005, at D1 
[hereinafter Shipley, BALCO Tab]. 
 23. BALCO Timeline, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, July 4, 2004 (wire report). 
 24. See Robertson, supra note 21. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 
(2001) (explaining the distinction between private conduct and state action subject to the 
constraints of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 28. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
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Part II poses a hypothetical due process challenge to the new 
standard of proof, and briefly explains some of the significant 
constitutional hurdles an athlete must overcome in order to succeed. 
Part III explores the Supreme Court’s state action jurisprudence 
and the various tests it has developed to distinguish private conduct 
from state action. 
Finally, Part IV argues that the USADA’s imposition of sanctions 
upon suspected dopers, following a proceeding using the comfortable 
satisfaction standard, is state action to which constitutional 
protections should apply.  
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USADA’S “RESULTS MANAGEMENT” 
A. The Olympic Movement and the Creation of the USADA 
The world of international sport is built around the Olympic 
Movement, the centerpiece of which is the Olympic Games.29 The 
Olympic Movement coordinates competition among athletes and also 
works to develop international sports law through its governing body, 
the International Olympic Committee (IOC).30 Beneath the IOC in 
the Olympic Movement’s pyramid-like structure lies a variety of 
athletic organizations. International Federations (IFs) autonomously 
supervise a specific sport at the international level.31 National 
Governing Bodies (NGBs) perform the same function within each 
respective country.32 National Olympic Committees supervise the 
NGBs and are responsible for the representation of their respective 
country at the Olympic Games.33 The powers of these bodies overlap 
considerably,34 and the history of doping control is marked by 
jurisdictional struggles and the attempts to resolve them.35 
 
 29. Straubel, supra note 7, at 531. 
 30. See Melissa R. Bitting, Comment, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic 
Athletes: Is the Process Better or Worse for “Job Security”?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 658 
(1998). 
 31. Id. at 659. For example, an IF would conduct the world championships for its 
particular sport. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. See Straubel, supra note 7, at 532–33. 
 35. Id. at 533. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p645 McCaffrey book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
650 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 22:645 
 
 
The cases of two American athletes, Mary Decker Slaney and 
Butch Reynolds, illustrate the jurisdictional struggles.36 Each athlete 
tested positive for a banned substance following a competition.37 
They challenged the validity of their test results, and each received 
conflicting answers: the American NGB for track and field 
exonerated the athletes, but the IF insisted that the drug tests were 
valid, and imposed lengthy suspensions.38 In each case, a resolution 
was delayed for several years as the national and international bodies 
vied for control of the anti-doping system.39 The athletes’ subsequent 
attempts to resort to the judicial system were unsuccessful, as each 
suit was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds.40 
Within the United States the difficulties arose from the conflicting 
congressional mandates given to the USOC: produce the best athletes 
possible, and test those athletes for performance-enhancing drugs.41 
At the time of Slaney’s and Reynold’s cases the USOC had an anti-
doping program, but its bylaws delegated the adjudication of positive 
 
 36. Mary Decker Slaney was a middle distance runner who won “World Championship 
gold medals in the 1500 and 3000” meters. Id. at 526 n.12. Reynolds was a sprinter who held 
world records in the 400 meters (both individually and as a member of a 4x400 relay team), and 
won gold and silver medals at the 1988 Olympics. Reynolds v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 23 
F.3d 1110, 1112 (6th Cir. 1994). 
 37. Slaney tested positive for elevated testosterone levels at the 1996 Olympic Trials. See 
Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2001). Reynolds tested 
positive for the steroid Nandrolone after a 1990 meet. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1112. 
 38. See Slaney, 244 F.3d at 586; Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1112. 
 39. Slaney tested positive in June of 1996 and withdrew from arbitration in late January 
1999. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 587. She believed it scientifically impossible to meet her burden of 
proving by clear and convincing evidence that the elevated testosterone level was due to non-
doping factors, and refused to attend her hearing. Id. This burden was imposed by the IF, not 
the American NGB. Id. Reynolds fought his test results for approximately two years. Reynolds, 
23 F.3d at 1113. 
 40. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 597; Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1121. 
 41. See Benedetti & Bunting, supra note 8, at 20. The power of the USOC to direct the 
representation of the United States at international sporting events and to resolve doping 
disputes is granted by the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–
220529 (2000) [hereinafter “Amateur Sports Act” or ASA]. The ASA established the USOC as 
a federally chartered corporation, and set forth multiple purposes to be met by the USOC. Id. 
§§ 220502(a), 220503. One purpose was to “provide swift resolution of conflicts and disputes 
involving amateur athletes . . . and protect the opportunity of any amateur athlete . . . to 
participate in amateur athletic competition.” Id. § 220503(8). While drug testing is a large part 
of that conflict resolution, the USOC is also directed “to obtain for the United States . . . the 
most competent amateur representation possible in each event of the Olympic Games . . . .” Id. 
§ 220503(4).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/29
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tests to each sport’s NGB.42 This self-regulated system generated a 
significant amount of international mistrust.43 The USOC’s attempts 
to alleviate such concerns eventually led to the creation of the 
USADA.44  
The USADA is a private, non-profit corporation created and then 
hired by the USOC to test and prosecute athletes for the use of 
performance-enhancing drugs.45 Its operations are funded by the 
USOC and the United States government, with the latter covering 
approximately 60% of its costs.46 The USADA proclaims its 
independence from the USOC,47 but the nature of their relationship 
leads some commentators to cast doubt on this assertion.48 
Regardless, the USADA is given authority to test, inter alia, any 
athlete who belongs to a USOC-sanctioned organization or who 
competes in a USOC-sanctioned event.49 
The USADA recently incorporated into its protocol the mandatory 
provisions of the Code introduced by WADA in 2003.50 The 
USADA’s adjudication procedures—collectively known as “Results 
 
 42. See Benedetti & Bunting, supra note 8, at 20. 
 43. See id. at 20. 
 44. The USOC’s Select Task Force on Drug Externalization “recommended an 
Independent Organization be created to conduct a comprehensive anti-doping program in the 
United States on behalf of the USOC.” Id. at 21.  
 45. See Straubel, supra note 7, at 559; see also U.S. ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, PROTOCOL 
FOR OLYMPIC MOVEMENT TESTING (2004), http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/what/ 
protocol.pdf [hereinafter USADA PROTOCOL]. 
 46. See Shipley, supra note 22.  
 47. The first sentence of the USADA Protocol asserts that “USADA is an independent 
legal entity not subject to the control of the USOC.” See USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 
1. The USADA website also attempts to distinguish the agency from the USOC. See U.S. Anti-
Doping Agency, Who We Are: USADA History, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/history. 
html (last visited Apr. 8, 2006). 
 48. See Benedetti & Bunting, supra note 8, at 34; Straubel, supra note 7, at 561 
(questioning whether the USADA is bound into an agency relationship with the USOC). 
 49. USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 1. Thus, any member of United States of 
America Track and Field (an NGB) is eligible for testing. Moreover, athletes who normally fall 
outside the USADA’s jurisdiction could be tested should they participate in certain events. For 
example, an NBA player competing for the United States in an Olympic-qualifying tournament 
could be tested. See Panel II, Regulations Governing Drugs and Performance Enhancers in 
Sports, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 337, 376–81 (2002) (discussing 
deterrent effect of extra drug testing on Olympic participation). 
 50. See USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 2. The Code provisions are contained in 
Annex A of the Protocol. Id. 
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Management”51—reflect the recent changes.52 While the Code limits 
the USADA’s prior discretion in creating and implementing Results 
Management procedures, the Code still complies with the Amateur 
Sports Act’s53 mandate that athletes be provided with notice and a 
hearing before being declared ineligible to participate.54 The Results 
Management process is outlined below. 
B. Results Management: Current Testing and Adjudication 
The USADA may conduct both “in-competition” and “out-of-
competition” tests55 in order to uncover the use of a substance on the 
Code’s “Prohibited List.”56 Positive tests are submitted to an Anti-
Doping Review Board, which decides whether there is sufficient 
evidence of doping to proceed with the adjudication.57 Some 
 
 51. See U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, What We Do: Results Management, http://www. 
usantidoping.org/what/management/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2006). 
 52. See USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 9. 
 53. Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220501–220529 (2000). 
 54. Id. § 220522(a)(8). The USOC Athletes’ Advisory Council recommends a “Due 
Process Checklist” to be applied to all hearings which may result in an athlete’s ineligibility. 
See United States Olympic Committee Due Process Checklist, http://www.usolympicteam.com/ 
12946_12966.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2006) [hereinafter Due Process Checklist]. Details are 
left unspecified, but the breadth of protection offered indicates that the stakes are high for an 
athlete in a doping adjudication. The list includes: “a hearing before a[n] . . . impartial body of 
fact finders; . . . the right to . . . legal council, if desired; the right to call witnesses and present 
oral and written evidence . . .; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; . . . a 
burden of proof . . . [that is] at least a ‘preponderance of the evidence’” borne by the proponent 
of the charge; and the right to an appeal. Id. 
 55. See USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 3. 
 56. Id. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE 2005 PROHIBITED LIST, http://www. 
wada-ama.org/docs/rtecontent/document/list_2005.pdf [hereinafter 2005 PROHIBITED LIST]. A 
substance is included on the list if it meets two of the following three criteria: (1) it has the 
“potential to enhance performance”; (2) it results in actual or potential harm to the athlete; (3) it 
“violates the spirit of sport.” U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Resources: FAQs, http://www. 
usantidoping.org/resources/faqs.aspx (follow “Code” hyperlink; then follow “How does a 
substance or method get included on the WADA Prohibited List?” hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 
8, 2006). 
 57. USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 6. Positive results are derived from an analysis 
of two urine samples provided by the athlete when selected for testing. U.S. Anti-Doping 
Agency, Resources: FAQs, http://www.usantidoping.org/resources/faqs.aspx (follow “Code” 
hyperlink; follow “Adjudication Process” hyperlink). The “B” sample is only analyzed if the 
“A” sample indicates doping, and it must confirm the “A” sample analysis in order to constitute 
a positive test. Id. A non-positive “B” sample analysis can insulate a suspected athlete from 
prosecution and sanction, but it does little to dispel the stigma that attaches to an accused doper. 
Bernard Lagat’s struggle to clear his name is illustrative. See Lagat Suing IAAF over False 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol22/iss1/29
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commentators analogize the Review Board stage to a preliminary 
hearing to determine probable cause in a criminal case.58 
If the Review Board deems the evidence of doping sufficient to 
proceed with sanctions, it informs the USADA, who in turn notifies 
the athlete of the specific charges it wishes to adjudicate.59 The 
athlete may either contest the sanction or accept the charges and 
penalty.60 Contested charges are resolved through mandatory, binding 
arbitration.61 Several legal and extra-legal factors in USADA 
arbitrations may influence the athlete’s decision to accept or contest 
the charges.62 
The basic doping violations—the presence of a prohibited 
substance in the body or the use of a prohibited substance—are 
considered strict liability offenses.63 Unless the athlete is able to 
prove the existence of truly exceptional circumstances, any intent, or 
even negligence, on his part is irrelevant.64 Two rationales are 
 
Doping Charges, COOL RUNNING, Sept. 14, 2005, http://www.coolrunning.com/engine/3/3_1/ 
lagat-suing-iaaf-over-fal.shtml. 
 58. See Straubel, supra note 7, at 563. The Review Board is comprised of three to five 
“experts independent of USADA with medical, technical, and legal knowledge of anti-doping 
matters.” USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 7. 
 59. USADA PROTOCOL, supra note 45, at 9. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 10. Typically, arbitration hearings take place before the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), using a slightly modified version of the AAA’s Commercial Arbitration 
Rules. Id. at 4. These rules are available at Annex E of the USADA Protocol. Id. The athlete 
may appeal the AAA decision to the International Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which 
conducts a de novo review, and issues a final and binding decision. Id. at 10. Alternatively, the 
athlete may elect to proceed directly before the CAS. Id. Although the USADA is the party 
officially opposing the athlete in arbitration, the USOC pays the “court costs” of the AAA 
adjudication. Id. The appeals fee to the CAS is paid by the athlete. Id. 
 62. As a practical matter, the estimated cost of a legal challenge is $60,000–$80,000. See, 
e.g., Amy Shipley, Caught Cheating, or Was She Cheated?, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2004, at D1 
[hereinafter Shipley, Caught Cheating]. This may not seem like an unfair price to pay in order 
to salvage a career, but one must consider that the “USADA has never lost a case.” Id. 
 63. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 8. “It is each Athlete’s personal duty 
to ensure that no Prohibited Substance enters his or her body. . . . Accordingly, it is not 
necessary that intent, fault, negligence or knowing Use on the Athlete’s part be demonstrated 
. . . .” Id. 
 64. See id. at 29–30. Article 10.5.1 of the Code permits a reduction or elimination of the 
period of ineligibility if the athlete can prove no fault or negligence based on exceptional 
circumstances. Id. The comment to Article 10.5.2 gives as an example the situation where an 
athlete is sabotaged by a competitor despite all due care. Id. at 30–31. However, the sanction 
could not be removed if a spouse, coach, or trainer sabotaged the athlete’s food or drink. Id. at 
31. 
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advanced to support this standard.65 First, in balancing the equities 
between an athlete who unintentionally used a prohibited substance 
and his non-performance-enhanced competitors, the law deems it just 
to burden the athlete who tested positive for a prohibited substance 
(regardless of whether performance was actually enhanced).66 
Second, to require proof of guilty intent would allow many dopers to 
escape sanction.67 Therefore, should a sample analysis indicate the 
presence of a prohibited substance,68 the arbitration may be a mere 
formality.69 
Though assertions of innocence fall on deaf ears,70 the scientific 
standards employed by drug testing labs at least ensure that the 
substance actually entered the athlete’s body.71 But, what if the 
athlete never failed a drug test? The USADA recently resorted to so-
called “non-analytical positives” in its prosecution of suspected 
dopers.72 A non-analytical positive is essentially documentary 
evidence of drug use—calendar entries, drug schedules, canceled 
checks—that the USADA considers to be the equivalent of a failed 
drug test.73 Some observers and athletes are highly critical of this 
tactic,74 but the USADA successfully persuaded several athletes who 
 
 65. Id. at 8–9 (contained in comment on Article 2.1.1). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. “[A] requirement of intent would invite costly litigation that may well cripple 
federations—particularly those run on modest budgets—in their fight against doping.” Id. 
 68. WADA-accredited labs are subject to rigorous scientific standards set by the World 
Anti-Doping Agency in their International Standard for Laboratories (“International 
Standard”). See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD FOR 
LABORATORIES (2004), http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/lab_aug_04.pdf 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL STANDARD]. The Code creates a presumption that laboratory 
analyses and procedures presented in doping offense adjudications are conducted in accordance 
with the International Standard. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 13. 
 69. See Shipley, Caught Cheating, supra note 62. 
 70. When asked about the fairness of imposing sanctions for unintended violations, 
WADA Chairman Dick Pound replied, “I would just say, ‘I’m sorry, but the doping offense is 
the presence of the stuff in your body. It doesn’t matter how it got there.’” Id. 
 71. See INTERNATIONAL STANDARD, supra note 68. 
 72. See Robertson, supra note 21; Shipley, BALCO Tab, supra note 22. 
 73. See Robertson, supra note 21. 
 74. See Sally Jenkins, This Agency Lacks the Inside Dope, WASH. POST, May, 17, 2004, at 
D1. Jenkins described the tactic as “Un-American” and felt it was used for political 
grandstanding and bullying athletes. Id. Marion Jones, currently under investigation by the 
USADA, nevertheless stated: “What the USADA is trying to do is find athletes guilty without 
any form of investigation.” Id.  
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never failed a drug test to accept sanctions after reviewing their “non-
analytical positives.”75 A major victory for the USADA came in 
December 2004 when sprinter Michelle Collins contested the 
imposition of sanctions based solely upon non-analytical positives 
and lost.76 Thus it appears that a positive sample, the “smoking gun” 
of doping cases, is no longer a prerequisite to a USADA prosecution.  
Of particular relevance to this Note is the source of the USADA’s 
non-analytical positives. In June 2003 a track coach sent the USADA 
a syringe containing a previously unknown and undetectable 
steroid.77 A few months later, federal agents began investigating the 
financial and medical records of the Bay Area Laboratory 
Cooperative (BALCO), a nutritional supplements company.78 The 
USADA became linked to this federal investigation when it 
determined that BALCO was the source of the new steroid and had 
allegedly distributed it to athletes within the USADA’s jurisdiction.79  
Evidence uncovered in the BALCO investigation led to federal 
charges of steroid distribution and money laundering.80 In April 2004 
 
 75. For instance, Alvin Harrison, an Olympic gold medalist, accepted a four-year 
suspension and forfeited all his results and monetary winnings since February 1, 2001. Press 
Release, U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, U.S. Track Athlete Harrison Receives Four-Year 
Suspension for Participation in BALCO Drug Conspiracy (Oct. 19, 2004), available at 
http://www.usantidoping.org/files/active/resources/press_releases/Tfaharrison101904[1].pdf. 
Because Harrison will not be able to compete again until age thirty-four, his career is 
effectively over. Harrison did not contest the non-analytical positives through the arbitration 
process. Id. 
 76. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Collins, Am. Arb. Ass’n, Case No. 30 190 00658 04 
(2004) (Rivkin, Arb.), available at http://www.usantidoping.org/what/management/arbitration. 
aspx (follow “2004” hyperlink; then follow “Former World Champion Collins” hyperlink). The 
panel of the North American Court of Arbitration for Sport based its decision on e-mails from 
Collins in which she admitted using some prohibited substances, and blood and urine test 
results from the private laboratory of Collins’s drug supplier. Id. at 16–17. Interestingly, Collins 
refused to explain the e-mails, asserting her Fifth Amendment right not to testify for fear of 
self-incrimination should she be indicted on a BALCO-related criminal charge. Id. 
 77. See BALCO Timeline, supra note 23. The substance was determined to be the steroid 
tetrahydrogestrione (THG). Id. 
 78. Id. FBI and IRS agents raided BALCO’s laboratories and offices, and a grand jury 
investigation began on October 23, 2003. Id. Many athletes, including track star Marion Jones 
and baseball player Barry Bonds, testified before the federal grand jury. Id. 
 79. Id. The athletes also include professional football and baseball players not subject to 
USADA testing. Id. 
 80. The forty-two-count indictment was announced on February 12, 2004, by Attorney 
General John Ashcroft against four men: BALCO president Victor Conte, vice-president James 
Valente, personal trainer Greg Anderson, and track coach Remi Korchemny. Id. On July 15, 
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the United States Senate’s Commerce Committee issued a subpoena 
to the Department of Justice in order to obtain documents relating to 
the investigation.81 The subpoena stemmed from a congressional 
interest in reducing the use of performance-enhancing drugs,82 
though at the time it was unclear how that goal would be achieved.83 
One month later the Senate unanimously consented to turn these 
documents over to the USADA, at the agency’s request.84 The agency 
believed, and the Senate apparently agreed, that the evidence was 
“critical to the credibility and reputation of American sport . . . [and 
that] timely access to these records [would] enable [USADA] to use 
them as evidence, if justified, in disciplinary proceedings.”85 The 
USADA subsequently charged fifteen athletes connected to BALCO 
with doping violations.86 The documentary evidence provided by the 
Senate became the “non-analytical positives” used to impose 
sanctions on athletes who had never tested positive for a banned 
substance.87 
The final step in the adjudication process is the imposition of 
penalties. The standard penalty under the Code is comprised of two 
 
2005, Conte and Anderson each pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute anabolic 
steroids and one count of money laundering. Valente pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute 
anabolic steroids. David Kravets, Korchemny Pleads Guilty in BALCO Scandal, USA TODAY, 
June 29, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2005-07-29-balco-korchemny-plea_x.htm. Two 
weeks later Korchemny pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor count of distributing modanifil. Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Three Defendants Please Guilty in BALCO Case (July 15, 
2005), available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/2005-07-29-balco-korchemny-plea_x.htm. 
 81. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., Committee to 
Subpoena DOJ Documents Relating to Banned Substance Use in Olympics (Apr. 8, 2004), 
available at http://commerce.senate.gov/newsroom/. According to Senator John McCain, the 
subpoena sought evidence “relating to U.S. amateur athletes’ alleged purchase of banned 
performance-enhancing substances from [BALCO], and their possible use of such substances.” 
Id. 
 82. Senator McCain stated that he was “keenly interested in curbing the use of banned 
performance-enhancing drugs by our nation’s athletes.” Id. 
 83. “The Committee will not comment further on the substance of this inquiry at this 
point, except to say that it will take every measure to protect the privacy of the Olympic athletes 
that may be involved.” Id. 
 84. See S. Res. 355, 108th Cong. (2004) (enacted). After considering the implications of 
athletes who may have doped participating in the summer Olympic Games, the Senate deemed 
the record production necessary for the promotion of justice. Id. 
 85. 150 CONG. REC. S5025 (daily ed. May 6, 2004) (statement of Sen. Frist). 
 86. See Shipley, BALCO Tab, supra note 22. Twelve of the fifteen charges have been 
resolved in the USADA’s favor; three are currently unresolved. Id. 
 87. Id.  
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elements.88 First, there is a disqualification of results and forfeiture of 
prizes from all events post-dating the initial rule violation.89 Second, 
a period of ineligibility is imposed.90 First time violators typically 
receive a two-year suspension, while repeat offenders are banned for 
life.91 The athlete may “plea bargain” with the USADA, and reduce 
his sanction by assisting in the prosecution of other suspected 
dopers.92 
However, under USOC anti-doping policies the athlete stands to 
lose considerably more than the opportunity to compete.93 Lost 
benefits include: USOC performance-based awards, tuition grants, 
access to training centers and sites, residences at Olympic training 
centers, coaching and sports medicine services, and health insurance 
provided by the USOC.94 Most commentators recognize that 
Olympic-caliber athletes today make a career of their sport, and 
equate the imposition of ineligibility with the loss of a job.95 
 
 88. WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 26–27. 
 89. Id. at 26 (disqualification of results from event in which violation occurs); see also id. 
at 34 (disqualification of results from competitions subsequent to sample collection).  
 90. Id. at 26–36 (defining ineligibility periods and possible reductions in certain 
circumstances). 
 91. Id. at 27. 
 92. Id. at 32. For example, sprinter Kelli White took advantage of this provision recently 
and the USADA reduced her ban from four years to two years. Amy Shipley, USADA Bans 
White for 2 Years, WASH. POST, May 20, 2004, at D1. White agreed to “clean[] up the sport” 
after being shown documentary evidence from the BALCO investigation. Id. She made good on 
her promise by testifying against fellow American sprinters Tim Montgomery and Chryste 
Gaines; the Court of Arbitration for Sport described her testimony as “fatal” to the sprinters’ 
cases. See John Powers, Montgomery, Gaines Banned, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14, 2005, at F1. 
 93. See U.S. OLYMPIC COMM., NATIONAL ANTI-DOPING POLICIES, at annex C (2004), 
http://www.usolympicteam.com/National_Anti-Doping_Policies_August_13_04.pdf. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See, e.g., Bitting, supra note 30, at 666 (“Couple the grants with prize money, throw 
in commercial endorsements and appearance fees, and top off the package by paying various 
coaching and training expenses, and an Olympic athlete may well have their entire livelihood 
dependent upon competing in their sport.”); Straubel, supra note 7, at 546 (“Olympic level 
performance demands professional level commitment: it is now a full time job.”). 
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C. Analogies to the American Criminal Justice System 
The indignation athletes directed toward the USADA96 is 
understandable when one considers that the agency announced its 
application of a new, less stringent standard of proof shortly after 
receiving the documentary evidence from the Senate.97 The athlete 
lost a certain amount of scientific protection, as verified sample 
analyses conducted by accredited laboratories were replaced with 
circumstantial evidence. He also lost the procedural protection of the 
reasonable doubt standard,98 as “comfortable satisfaction” is an easier 
burden for the USADA to meet.99 
The loss of this particular procedural protection may strike the 
athlete as especially unfair, given the similarities between the 
criminal justice system and the USADA’s “Results Management.”100 
Doping adjudications are part of an accusatorial system, with 
proscribed activities and punishments.101 A stigma attaches to an 
athlete accused of doping, similar to that endured by many criminal 
defendants.102 Many of the Sixth Amendment guarantees given to the 
 
 96. Perhaps overstating the case a bit, hurdler Allen Johnson compared the USADA to the 
Gestapo. See Robertson, supra note 21. Marion Jones called the agency a “secret kangaroo 
court.” See Shipley, BALCO Tab, supra note 22. 
 97. The USADA received the BALCO-related evidence on May 6, 2004. BALCO 
Timeline, supra note 23. USADA Director of Legal Affairs Travis Tygart announced that the 
“reasonable doubt” burden of proof would be replaced with the “comfortable satisfaction” 
standard in a memo dated June 1, 2004. See Gloster, supra note 20. 
 98. “The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal 
procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. 
The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of innocence . . . .” In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
 99. “This standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but 
less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 12. 
While this standard of proof is largely unfamiliar to the American legal system, the comment to 
Article 3.1 states that it “is comparable to the standard which is applied in most countries to 
cases involving professional misconduct.” Id.  
 100. See supra Part I.B. 
 101. See Straubel, supra note 7, at 569 (“[T]he athlete is being accused of an act of moral 
turpitude: cheating by intentionally taking illegal substances. These acts are malum in se. Then, 
as punishment, the athlete is . . . in a sense, being placed on probation.”). 
 102. Id. at 546; accord In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 (“The accused during a criminal 
prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance . . . because of the certainty that he 
would be stigmatized by the conviction.”). 
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accused in a criminal prosecution are also included in the USOC’s 
“Due Process Checklist.”103  
Moreover, it is a federal crime to possess, use, or traffic in some 
of the substances included on the Code’s Prohibited List. For 
example, possession of anabolic steroids is prohibited104 and warrants 
a sentence of up to five years in prison.105 In 2004 Congress devoted 
increased attention to this type of drug,106 which is relatively 
common.107 Federal regulation would extend to anabolic steroid 
precursors108 and the standard penalties for distributing anabolic 
steroids would double should the distribution take place at or near a 
sports facility.109 The Senate pressed even harder on the issue in 2005 
with the introduction of the Clean Sports Act.110 This bill sought to 
establish minimum drug testing standards for professional sports 
 
 103. Both the Sixth Amendment and the “Due Process Checklist” include the right to be 
notified of the specific charges pending and their potential consequences; the right to a hearing 
at a time and place convenient to the accused, and held before an impartial fact finder; the right 
to legal counsel; the right to call witnesses; and the right to confront adverse witnesses. 
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. VI, with Due Process Checklist, supra note 54. 
 104. See 21 U.S.C. § 812(c), Schedule III(e) (2000); 2005 PROHIBITED LIST, supra note 56. 
 105. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D). An individual also may be fined not more than 
$250,000. Id. 
 106. See Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-358, 2004 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
(118 Stat.) 1661.  
 107. See NAT’L INST. ON DRUG ABUSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
RESEARCH REPORT SERIES—ANABOLIC STEROID ABUSE, available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/ 
PDF/RRSteroi.pdf. 
 108. See § 2, 118 Stat. at 1661–63. Steroid precursors are a common ingredient in 
nutritional supplements used by athletes. See Abuse of Anabolic Steroids and Their Precursors 
by Adolescent Amateur Athletes: Hearing Before the S. Caucus on International Narcotics 
Control, 108th Cong. 17–19 (2004) (statement of Terrance P. Madden, Chief Executive Officer 
United States Anti-Doping Agency). An example of a steroid precursor is androstenedione, the 
supplement used by baseball player Mark McGuire during his home-run record-breaking 
season. Id. at 18. 
 109. See 150 CONG. REC. H3660 (daily ed. June 2, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Sensenbrenner) (clerk’s reading of text of H.R. 3866). The USADA fully supported the bill. See 
Anabolic Steroid Control Act of 2004: Hearing on H.R. 3866 Before the H. Subcomm. on 
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 10–
12 (2004) (statement of Doctor Ralph Hale, Chairman, United States Anti-Doping Agency).  
 110. S. 1114, 109th Cong. (2005). The threatened passage of this legislation induced Major 
League Baseball to toughen its drug-testing policy in November 2005; this action stopped the 
bill’s progress as Senator McCain believed it to achieve the Act’s goals. NAT’L CTR. FOR DRUG 
FREE SPORT, INC., MLB Drug-Testing, INSIGHT, Fourth Quarter 2005, at 3, 3, available at 
http://www.drugfreesport.com/home.asp (follow “Insight Newsletter” hyperlink; then follow 
the “Fourth Quarter 2005” hyperlink; then follow “MLB Drug-Testing” hyperlink). 
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leagues, with such standards to be at least as stringent as those 
imposed by the USADA.111 The Clean Sports Act prescribes 
suspensions and lifetime bans as punishment for positive drug 
tests,112 but it does not address whether criminal punishment would 
be imposed for the same conduct. These similarities between doping 
offenses and their adjudication and the American criminal justice 
system form the basis for the athlete’s hypothetical due process 
challenge regarding the “comfortable satisfaction” standard of 
proof.113 
II. THE DUE PROCESS CHALLENGE 
As noted previously, the athlete must clear some significant 
hurdles in order to succeed on the due process challenge posed by the 
“comfortable satisfaction” standard of proof.114 The potential 
stumbling blocks include: a judicial reluctance to interfere with 
arbitration results in general, and with athletic disputes in 
particular;115 the burden of showing some liberty or property 
interest;116 and the unpredictability of the Mathews v. Eldridge 
balancing test.117 
 
 111. S. 1114 § 4(b). 
 112. S. 1114 § 4(b)(7). 
 113. Commentators recognize that doping adjudications also share characteristics of civil 
law, and while there is some disagreement over the requisite level of procedural protection, a 
trend toward criminal law protection has emerged at both the academic and political levels. See 
Antonio Rigozzi et al., Doping and Fundamental Rights of Athletes: Comments in the Wake of 
the Adoption of the World Anti-Doping Code, INT’L SPORTS L. REV., Aug. 2003, at 37, 48–49. 
An International Sports Law Conference in 1999 emphasized the severity of the consequences 
for a suspended athlete, and recommended the application of criminal law procedures to protect 
the athlete. Id. at 48. Doping offenses are criminal offenses in several European nations, 
including Greece, Belgium, France, and Italy. See Gregory Ioannidis, Legal Regulation of 
Doping in Sport: The Case for the Prosecution, OBITER, Nov. 2003, at 15, 17, available at 
http://www.lawfile.org.uk/obiter.htm (follow “November 2003” hyperlink). 
 114. See supra pp. 4–5. 
 115. See Slaney v. Int’l Amateur Athletic Fed’n, 244 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 116. “The requirements of procedural due process apply only to the deprivation of interests 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of liberty and property.” Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). 
 117. 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976). 
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A. Arbitration and the “Right to Compete” 
Federal courts are not receptive to the complaints of a suspended 
athlete.118 The arbitral awards of the International Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), to whom an athlete is required to appeal 
for a final and binding decision,119 are rarely overturned by a federal 
court because of the United Nations Convention on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“the New York 
Convention”).120 Moreover, courts have long held that the Amateur 
Sports Act does not create a “right to compete” giving rise to a 
private cause of action under the Act.121 Deferring to the USOC’s 
jurisdiction, federal courts typically conclude that it is simply 
inappropriate for the judiciary to determine athletic eligibility.122 
B. Property and Liberty Interests of the Athlete 
The athlete also must show that the challenged disciplinary action 
infringes upon a constitutionally protected liberty or property 
interest.123 Some commentators assume that the athlete possesses a 
property interest that may be damaged by a ban from competition.124 
 
 118. See, e.g., Slaney, 244 F.3d 580. 
 119. See supra note 61. 
 120. Urvasi Naidoo & Neil Sarin, Dispute Resolution at Games Time, 12 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 489, 493–94 (2002). The New York Convention provides for 
narrow grounds on which a court may refuse to recognize a foreign arbitral award. Id. at 494. 
One of these grounds—that the award was contrary to public policy—was considered and 
rejected by the Slaney court. Slaney, 244 F.3d at 593–94 (rebuttable presumption of guilt 
created by positive drug test not contrary to public policy). 
 121. See Slaney, 244 F.3d at 594; Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 
1984). The Michels court reviewed the interesting legislative history of the ASA, noting that at 
one point the Act contained an “‘Amateur Athlete’s Bill of Rights,’ which included a civil 
cause of action in federal district court for any athlete against an NGB, educational institution, 
or other sports organization that threatened to deny the athlete’s right to participate in certain 
events.” Michels, 741 F.2d at 157–58. Strong resistance by colleges and high schools led to 
removal of the provision. Id. at 158. 
 122. Michels, 741 F.2d at 159 (“[T]here can be few less suitable bodies than the federal 
courts for determining the eligibility . . . of athletes to participate in the Olympic Games.”) 
(Posner, J., concurring).  
 123. “Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which 
deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 
(1976). 
 124. See Thomas A. Mayes, Comment, Tonya Harding’s Case: Contractual Due Process, 
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Presumably, a court is increasingly likely to find a property interest 
as the economic benefits gained from competition become more 
certain.125 Thus, the athlete’s property interests could include the 
entitlements granted by the USOC or the prize money earned in past 
performances.126 
Liberty interests are defined broadly.127 Courts recognize that 
where governmental action places a person’s reputation at stake, 
some form of due process may be required.128 This is particularly true 
when the government imposes a stigma upon the person that 
forecloses his or her freedom to take advantage of other employment 
opportunities.129 The court in NCAA v. Yeo130 held that a swimmer 
possessed a liberty interest in protecting her athletic reputation.131 
Due to the swimmer’s status as an Olympian, the court equated her 
athletic reputation with a professional reputation.132  
This decision recognizes that Olympic-caliber athletes now earn a 
living and make a career of their sport.133 When the USADA accuses 
an athlete of doping, a significant stigma attaches to him that may 
impede his ability to work at the highest level.134 Thus, there is some 
 
the Amateur Athlete, and the American Ideal of Fair Play, 3 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 109, 134–36 
(1995); Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 117, at 496. 
 125. Mayes, supra note 124, at 136. 
 126. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. These assumptions are problematic 
because they depend on the USOC being classified as a state actor, a step the Supreme Court 
has refused to take. See infra Part III.B.  
 127. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). The liberty interest includes:  
[T]he right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations 
of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, 
to worship God . . . and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized . . . as 
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
 128. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. 
 129. Id. 
 130. 114 S.W.3d 584 (Tex. App. 2003), rev’d by 171 S.W.3d 863 (Tex. 2005). 
 131. Id. at 598. 
 132. Id. At least part of this decision appears driven by Yeo’s potential to benefit 
financially from her athletic career. The court distinguished Yeo from other intercollegiate 
athletes who had not established a similar international athletic reputation. Id. at 601. It believed 
the athlete’s protected interest analysis to be fact-specific: “Each such case must be decided on 
its own merits, in light of the financial realities of contemporary athletic competition.” Id. at 
598. 
 133. See supra note 95. 
 134. See Robertson, supra note 21. Several track athletes implicated in the BALCO scandal 
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basis for claiming an interest worthy of protection under the Fifth 
Amendment.135 
C. The Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test 
Finally, there is uncertainty inherent in a court’s application of the 
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test.136 This test determines the 
specific dictates of due process for the disciplinary action—that is, 
the procedural safeguards necessary to protect the athlete’s interest in 
competing. Three factors are considered: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
finally, the Government’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.137 
The inquiry is necessarily fact-specific.138 There is a chance that a 
court will find the athlete’s interest to be of little value, or that use of 
the “comfortable satisfaction” standard of proof runs only an 
insignificantly greater risk of depriving the athlete of that interest.139 
Conversely, the court could conclude that due process demands the 
use of the “reasonable doubt” standard in this situation. However, the 
nuances of the balancing test will not be addressed by a court until 
one more prerequisite is satisfied: the state action requirement.140  
 
blamed their poor performances at the Olympic Trials on the increased scrutiny that 
accompanied doping accusations. Id. 
 135. “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 136. 424 U.S. 319, 347–49 (1976). 
 137. Id. at 335. 
 138. “[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands.” Id. at 321 (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)). 
 139. For an analysis of the difficulties in balancing an athlete’s interest in competing with 
the potentially countervailing interests of the sports organization and society-at-large, see 
Mayes, supra note 124, at 141–47. 
 140. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 
(2001) (“Our cases try to plot a line between state action subject to Fourteenth Amendment 
scrutiny and private conduct (however exceptionable) that is not.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p645 McCaffrey book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
664 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 22:645 
 
 
III. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE 
The requirement of state action under the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments serves two purposes: it 
preserves individual freedom by limiting the reach of a federal law,141 
and it assures that constitutional standards are imposed “when it can 
be said that the State is responsible for the specific conduct of which 
the plaintiff complains.”142 
A. The Blum Trilogy Tests 
To determine when a state is responsible for the complained-of 
conduct, the Supreme Court developed three guiding principles that 
were crystallized in a trio of cases known as the Blum Trilogy.143 The 
first is known as the symbiotic relationship test.144 Under this test, 
state action exists when a close nexus between the state and a private 
entity, resulting from joint actions or an interdependent relationship, 
transforms the private entity’s actions into those of the state.145 The 
second test, the public function test, finds state action when a “private 
entity perform[s] an action that is traditionally performed exclusively 
by the state.”146 Finally, the state compulsion test finds state action 
when the government coerces or encourages a private entity to 
engage in the challenged conduct.147 The particular facts and 
 
 141. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988). 
 142. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). 
 143. The cases are: Blum, 457 U.S. 991; Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982); 
and Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). See, e.g., Megan M. Cooper, Casenotes, 
Dusting Off the Old Play Book: How the Supreme Court Disregarded the Blum Trilogy, 
Returned to Theories of the Past, and Found State Action Through Entwinement in Brentwood 
Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 913 (2002). 
 144. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 913–14. 
 145. Id. This test evolved from the Court’s proclamation in Burton v. Wilmington Parking 
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961): “The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of 
interdependence . . . that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity, 
which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so ‘purely private’ as to fall without 
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Burton, 365 U.S. at 725. 
 146. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 914. The public function doctrine is not construed 
liberally. For example, in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn a private school providing special education 
for students unable to cope in a regular high school and funded almost exclusively by the state 
was not found to perform a function that was traditionally and exclusively public. Rendell-
Baker, 457 U.S. at 842–43. 
 147. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 914; accord Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296 (“[A] 
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circumstances of each case will determine the outcome under these 
three tests.148 
To determine whether the current Supreme Court would find the 
USADA to be a state actor, several precedents must be examined. 
First, San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic 
Committee149 is an unfavorable precedent that the current Court must 
distinguish on its facts. While the Court in that case narrowly 
interpreted the Blum Trilogy tests,150 subsequent cases employed a 
more liberal analysis.151 The Court further distanced itself from the 
Blum Trilogy tests in Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary 
School Athletic Association,152 where it employed a novel and 
somewhat undefined “pervasive entwinement” theory to find that a 
nominally private athletic association was in fact a state actor.153 
B. San Francisco Arts & Athletics 
In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the Supreme Court upheld the 
USOC’s injunction against San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. 
(SFAA), preventing the petitioner from using the word “olympic” in 
its athletic competitions.154 The Amateur Sports Act (ASA) grants the 
USOC the right to prohibit certain commercial and promotional uses 
 
challenged activity may be state action when it results from the State’s exercise of ‘coercive 
power’ [or] when the State provides ‘significant encouragement, either overt or covert’ . . . .”) 
(citations omitted). 
 148. Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 295. “From the range of circumstances that could point 
toward the State behind an individual face, no one fact can function as a necessary condition 
across the board for finding state action; nor is any set of circumstances absolutely sufficient 
. . . .” Id. 
 149. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 150. See infra pp. 25–29 and accompanying notes. 
 151. See infra p. 29 and accompanying notes. 
 152. 531 U.S. 288 (2001). 
 153. Id. at 298. The dissent believed the “entwinement” theory to be a distortion of earlier 
state action cases and criticized its uncertain boundaries: “The majority does not define 
‘entwinement,’ and the meaning of the term is not altogether clear. But whatever this new 
‘entwinement’ theory may entail, it lacks any support in our state-action jurisprudence.” Id. at 
312 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 154. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 548 (1987). San 
Francisco Arts and Athletics, Inc. wanted to host a “Gay Olympic Games,” including a cross-
country relay wherein “the final runner would enter the stadium with the ‘Gay Olympic Torch’ 
and light the ‘Gay Olympic Flame.’” Id. at 525. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p645 McCaffrey book pages.doc  12/4/2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
666 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 22:645 
 
 
of the word “olympic.”155 The SFAA argued that this exclusive use 
granted by the ASA violated the First Amendment,156 and that the 
USOC’s enforcement of the right was discriminatory in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment.157 The Court did not reach the merits of the 
second issue because it held that the USOC was not a governmental 
actor to whom the Fifth Amendment’s equal protection limitations 
could apply.158 
First, the Court dismissed the argument that Congress’s grant of a 
corporate charter to the USOC rendered it a government agent.159 The 
Court noted that all corporations operate under charters granted by a 
government.160 To find state action on this basis would transform 
almost any corporate act into government conduct, a dramatic step 
the Court was unwilling to take.161 Furthermore, extensive 
government subsidization and regulation of a corporation did not 
require the state to assume constitutional responsibility for the private 
conduct.162 
Next, applying the public function test, the Court found that 
“[n]either the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports has 
been a traditional government function.”163 It acknowledged that the 
USOC’s activities served a national interest,164 but found this 
insufficient to fairly attribute those activities to the state.165 
 
 155. See 36 U.S.C. § 220506 (2000). In conjunction with its exclusive right to use the 
names and symbols listed in section 220506(a)(1)-(4), the USOC is authorized to file a civil 
action against any person who uses such words and symbols to promote an athletic performance 
without the USOC’s consent. Id. 
 156. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 531–32. 
 157. Id. at 542. 
 158. Id. at 547. 
 159. Id. at 543. 
 160. Id. at 543–44. The Court also noted that “[a]ll enforceable rights in trademarks are 
created by some governmental act . . . .” Id. at 544. 
 161. Id. at 543 n.23. 
 162. Id. at 544 (citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1011 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982)). 
 163. Id. at 545. 
 164. Id. at 544. The USOC was created to coordinate the disorganized and discordant 
factions in American amateur sport, and also was intended to serve a representational function 
to the international athletic community. Id. at 545–46 n.27. 
 165. Id. at 544. 
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The Court concluded its analysis with the state compulsion test.166 
“Most fundamentally . . . a government ‘normally can be held 
responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive 
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt 
or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the 
[government].’”167 There was no evidence that the government 
encouraged or coerced the USOC in the choice of how to enforce its 
trademark rights.168 At most, the government may have approved of 
or acquiesced in the USOC’s conduct.169 Therefore, the Court held 
that the USOC was not a state actor.170  
A dissenting opinion believed that the USOC’s action was 
governmental conduct.171 The dissent’s opinion was based on the 
traditional governmental functions performed by the USOC, and the 
close nexus between the government and the challenged action of the 
USOC.172 It concluded that while the government was free to 
privatize functions it would otherwise perform, that fact should not 
release the nominally private entity from constitutional obligations.173 
In the years between San Francisco Arts & Athletics and 
Brentwood Academy, the Court heard two cases which some 
commentators interpret as a relaxation of the Blum Trilogy’s state 
action tests.174 In NCAA v. Tarkanian,175 the Court “modified the 
 
 166. Id. at 546. 
 167. Id. at 546 (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004). 
 168. Id. at 547. 
 169. Id. (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004–05). 
 170. Id. at 547. 
 171. Id. at 548 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 172. Id. at 548–49. The dissent believed that the USOC did more than merely serve a 
public interest: it “has been endowed by the Federal Government with the exclusive power to 
serve a unique national, administrative, adjudicative, and representational role.” Id. at 555. 
Moreover, there was a symbiotic relationship between the government and the USOC which 
conferred a number of benefits on both parties. See id. at 556–59. Finally, making a point not 
addressed by the majority, the dissent found it significant that “in the eye of the public . . . the 
connection between the decisions of the United States Government and those of the [USOC] is 
profound.” Id. at 557. 
 173. Id. at 560. 
 174. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 951 (“In the years that followed the Blum Trilogy, the 
Court modified its state action tests.”). 
 175. 488 U.S. 179 (1988). In this case, former University of Nevada, Las Vegas basketball 
coach Jerry Tarkanian faced disciplinary action from his state university employer based upon 
recommendations made by the NCAA. Id. at 186–87. At issue was whether the NCAA was a 
state actor and thus required to afford Tarkanian some form of due process. Id. at 191–92. 
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symbiotic relationship test and analyzed all factors that created a 
symbiotic relationship between the parties, not just those directly 
related to the challenged conduct.”176 In Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co.,177 the Court allegedly altered the public function test 
by discarding the “exclusivity” requirement.178 Assuming these 
interpretations of Tarkanian and Edmonson are correct, the 
modifications would significantly reduce a plaintiff’s burden in 
proving state action.179 
C. Brentwood Academy  
The Supreme Court in Brentwood Academy continued the trend 
away from the Blum Trilogy’s state action tests.180 The question 
presented in Brentwood Academy was whether the Tennessee 
Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), a nominally 
private organization, was a state actor required to follow substantive 
and procedural due process guidelines in imposing sanctions on a 
member high school.181 The TSSAA regulates interscholastic sports 
in Tennessee among the private and public high schools that choose 
to join the organization.182 Its governing councils are comprised of 
principals, assistant principals, and superintendents from public 
schools.183 TSSAA staff members are not paid by the state but are 
eligible to join the state’s public retirement system for its 
employees.184 At one point in time the TSSAA was officially 
 
Phrasing the symbiotic relationship test somewhat differently, the Court asked whether the 
State “knowingly accept[ed] the benefits derived from unconstitutional behavior . . . [or] 
provided a mantle of authority that enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual . . . .”  
Id. at 192. The Court found no state action in this case. Id. at 199. 
 176. Cooper, supra note 143, at 951. 
 177. 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991). The majority in Edmonson held that in a civil proceeding, a 
private litigant’s use of peremptory challenges on the basis of race constituted state action for 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection purposes. Id. 
 178. Cooper, supra note 143, at 951. 
 179. Id. at 960 (describing the cases as lenient interpretations of existing state action 
doctrine). 
 180. Id. at 914. 
 181. Id. at 917–18. 
 182. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001). 
Public high schools comprised approximately 84% of the TSSAA’s voting membership. Id.  
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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designated by the state as the organization to supervise and regulate 
high school sport in Tennessee.185 
On the basis of these facts, the Court held that the private 
character of the TSSAA was “overborne by the pervasive 
entwinement of public institutions and public officials in its 
composition and workings . . . .”186 The Court’s analysis did not 
require the facts of the case to fit within one of its standard state 
action tests.187 It indicated that “entwinement” was merely a 
descriptive term used to characterize the various criteria applied in 
those earlier analyses.188 Because the facts revealed a largely 
overlapping identity between the TSSAA and the state, a finding of 
state action in this case was appropriate.189  
As might be expected, this departure from precedent drew a 
highly critical dissent190 which viewed the “entwinement” theory as a 
dangerous expansion of the Court’s state action jurisprudence.191 It 
examined the facts of the case using the Blum Trilogy’s state action 
 
 185. Id. at 292. 
 186. Id. at 298. The Court also stated that “the character of a legal entity is determined 
neither by its expressly private characterization in statutory law, nor by the failure of the law to 
acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from recognized government officials or agencies.” Id. 
at 296. In support of this proposition the Court cited Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger 
Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995), which held that Amtrak was a state actor “for constitutional 
purposes, regardless of its congressional designation as private; it was organized under federal 
law to attain governmental objectives and was directed and controlled by federal appointees.” 
Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 296. 
 187. “[T]his case does not turn on a public function test . . . it avails the [TSSAA] nothing 
to stress that the State neither coerced nor encouraged the actions complained of. . . . Facts that 
address any of these criteria are significant, but no one criterion must necessarily be applied.” 
Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 303. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. Interestingly, the Court indicated that some sort of balancing test could be applied 
which would allow the TSSAA to escape its classification as a state actor. “Even facts that 
suffice to show public action (or, standing alone, would require such a finding) may be 
outweighed in the name of some value at odds with finding public accountability in the 
circumstances.” Id. The Court considered the countervailing factors raised by the TSSAA—for 
instance, “an epidemic of unprecedented federal litigation”—but deemed them insufficient to 
change the outcome of the analysis. Id. at 304. 
 190. Id. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy in his opinion. Id. 
 191. The dissent warned that the test could reach other organizations composed of or 
controlled by public officials, like firemen, policemen, or teachers. Id. at 314. “I am not 
prepared to say that any private organization that permits public entities and public officials to 
participate acts as the State in anything or everything it does, and our state-action jurisprudence 
has never reached that far.” Id. at 315. 
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tests and concluded that the TSSAA’s disciplinary actions were not 
fairly attributable to the state.192 
IV. THE USADA AS A STATE ACTOR 
As noted earlier, an athlete’s due process suit against the USADA 
is far from a guaranteed success.193 The law, if not directly opposed 
to the athlete’s position,194 is at least so uncertain as to make the 
outcome largely unforeseeable.195 This is the case with the state 
action doctrine, which underwent varying degrees of expansion and 
contraction before the Brentwood Academy Court further confused 
the issue.196 Moreover, the Supreme Court as it now stands is almost 
evenly split, with four Justices showing no sign of relinquishing the 
prior state action tests.197 Nevertheless, recent developments in the 
USADA’s doping procedures and adjudications provide the factual 
basis for finding state action using either a Blum Trilogy or 
Brentwood Academy analysis. 
A. The Public Function Test 
The athlete should not expect the public function test to reveal 
state action.198 Success hinges upon two factors: the Court’s 
characterization of the function, and its adherence to the “exclusivity” 
 
 192. The dissent noted that “organization of interscholastic sports is neither a traditional 
nor an exclusive public function of the States,” id. at 309; that the state did not exercise 
coercive power or provide encouragement in the enforcement of TSSAA’s rule, id. at 310 
(citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)); and that there was “no symbiotic 
relationship” or close nexus between the private organization and the state. Id. at 311. 
 193. See supra Part II. 
 194. See, e.g., Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
the ASA does not create a private cause of action and that there is no right to compete). 
 195. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test). 
 196. Cooper, supra note 143, chronicles the advent of the “rigid” state action tests set forth 
in the Blum Trilogy, id. at 936–51; the tests’ subsequent relaxations, id. at 951–59; and 
Brentwood Academy’s return to a pre-Blum Trilogy “entanglement” or “totality of contacts” 
theory. Id. at 986. 
 197. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 305–15 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 198. The Court has found government action when the challenged entity performs 
functions that are “traditionally the exclusive prerogative” of the government. Rendell-Baker v. 
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 
(1974)). 
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prong. The Court’s description of the function performed by the 
USADA will be important. If the Court adopted the USADA’s 
mission statement—the “USADA is dedicated to preserving the well 
being of Olympic sport, the integrity of competition, and ensuring the 
health of athletes”199—it is unlikely to treat this function as 
traditionally governmental.200 However, a more specific 
characterization (for instance, the prerogative to impose regulations 
upon and punishment for the use of specified drugs) could be seen as 
a traditional government function.201 
Both the USADA and the government regulate the use and 
distribution of cocaine, amphetamines, marijuana, and certain 
steroids;202 and each entity imposes punishments for violations.203 
Although the list of drugs subject to regulation is constantly 
evolving204 and different punishments are meted out by each entity,205 
such details do not alter the nature of this function. In contrast to the 
non-governmental duties described in its mission statement, the 
USADA performs a traditional government function in this respect. 
 
 199. See U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, USADA Mission, http://www.usantidoping.org/who/ 
mission.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 200. In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, the majority described the USOC’s function as “the 
conduct [and] . . . coordination of amateur sports,” and concluded that this was not “a 
traditional governmental function.” S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522, 545 (1987). The dissent reached a contrary conclusion regarding this function, id. at 
553 (Brennan, J., dissenting), and added one of its own: the USOC performed the “distinctive, 
traditional government function [of] represent[ing] this Nation to the world community.” Id. at 
550. 
 201. See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Drugs and Controlled Substances § 19 (2004). American 
Jurisprudence states: 
The regulation of the possession, sale and use of various drugs is within the police 
power of the state. . . . [A] state legislature, in the exercise of its police power, has the 
right to reasonably regulate the administration of drugs for the protection of the lives, 
health, safety, and welfare of the people. . . .  
 With regard to federal regulation, Congress undoubtedly possesses the authority to 
proscribe drugs it considers dangerous to the public welfare. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 202. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2000); 2005 PROHIBITED LIST, supra note 56. 
 203. See supra notes 88–92, 104–06 and accompanying text. 
 204. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text.  
 205. Compare WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE, supra note 2, at 27 (imposing two-year ban on 
competition), with 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (imposing punishment not to exceed five years in 
prison or $250,000 in fines). 
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Similarly, the Supreme Court’s adherence to the “exclusivity” 
prong of the public function test could be dispositive.206 One may 
assume that imposing sanctions for the use and distribution of drugs 
that are dangerous to health and safety is a traditional function of 
government.207 However, it is not uncommon for private employers 
to condition employment upon compliance with drug testing and 
usage guidelines.208 If, as the Brentwood Academy dissent insists, the 
challenged function must be both traditionally and exclusively public, 
then state action will not be found under this test.209 Alternatively, if 
commentators are correct in asserting that Edmonson discarded the 
exclusivity prong,210 the athlete’s position under the public function 
test is substantially stronger. 
B. The Symbiotic Relationship Test 
State action is more readily found under the symbiotic relationship 
test.211 The relationship between the USADA and the federal 
government confers a variety of benefits upon each entity.212 The 
 
 206. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 951 (asserting that the Edmonson Court abandoned the 
exclusivity prong). 
 207. See supra note 198. 
 208. The Department of Labor attempts to provide drug-testing guidance to employers 
through its Working Partners for an Alcohol- and Drug-Free Workplace program. See U.S. 
Dep’t of Labor, Working Partners for an Alcohol- and Drug-Free Workplace, 
http://www.dol.gov/workingpartners/welcome.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). The program’s 
website contains sample drug-testing policies and information on various state and federal laws 
that may impact those policies. Id. 
 209. “The organization of interscholastic sports is neither a traditional nor an exclusive 
public function of the States.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 288, 309 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 210. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 951. The Edmonson Court asked only “whether the 
action in question involves the performance of a traditional function of the government.” 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991). The Edmonson dissent 
believed the majority misstated the law: “In order to constitute state action under this doctrine, 
private conduct must not only comprise something that the government traditionally does, but 
something that only the government traditionally does.” Id. at 640 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
Interestingly, Justice O’Connor joined the majority in Brentwood Academy, where a strict 
application of the public function test would almost certainly have been fatal to the plaintiff’s 
state action claim. See Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 290. 
 211. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 212. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961) (“It cannot be 
doubted that the peculiar relationship . . . confers on each [party] an incidental variety of mutual 
benefits.”). 
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evidence derived from the BALCO investigation aided the USADA 
significantly in its mission to preserve the integrity of sport and the 
health of athletes.213 This is true in regard to both deterrence and 
punishment. As one athletics official stated, “[T]he fear factor created 
by the BALCO investigation and the new weapon of non-analytical 
positives holds real promise for deterring, or catching, the group of 
athletes I call ‘dedicated cheaters.’”214 The United States government 
benefits as well. By facilitating the suspension of athletes who 
compete under a cloud of suspicion but have never tested positive, 
the United States can quickly rehabilitate its reputation for fair play 
in the international sports community.215 The statements of Senator 
McCain216 and the Senate’s resolution to share the BALCO 
documents217 indicate that United States’ athletic credibility and 
reputation are, in fact, valued benefits.218  
C. The State Compulsion Test 
The state action test most favorable to the athlete is the state 
compulsion test.219 In San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc.,220 the 
majority found this to be the most fundamental criterion in finding 
state action.221 It is difficult to maintain that the government did not 
 
 213. See supra notes 80–87 and accompanying text. 
 214. See Craig A. Masback, Chief Executive Officer, U.S.A. Track & Field, Statement to 
Media (July 6, 2004), available at http://www.usatf.org/news/view.aspx?DUID=USATF_ 
2004_07_06_10_24_20 (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
 215. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 82. 
 217. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 218. It is relevant that the interests of the USADA and the government of the United States 
(or at least, the Senate) are nearly identical. In contrast, the Tarkanian Court rejected a 
“symbiotic relationship” argument by noting that “the state and private parties’ relevant 
interests do not coincide, as they did in Burton; rather, they have clashed throughout . . . . 
UNLV and the NCAA were antagonists, not joint participants . . . .” NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. 179, 196–97 n.16 (1988). But see S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 
U.S. 522, 544 (1987) (“The fact ‘[t]hat a private entity performs a function which serves the 
public does not make its acts [governmental] action.’” (quoting Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 
U.S. 830, 842 (1982))).  
 219. The test investigates whether the state “has exercised coercive power or has provided 
such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to 
be that of the government.” S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 546 (1987). 
 220. 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 221. Id. at 546. 
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provide significant, overt encouragement to the USADA. The Senate 
subpoenaed the Department of Justice to obtain its BALCO 
evidence.222 The Senate met with the USADA to discuss that 
evidence, and then gave it to the agency so that certain athletes could 
be suspended prior to the Olympic Games.223 The government 
influenced the USADA’s choice of how to enforce its doping rules by 
supplying it with the means to prosecute without a positive drug 
test.224 This action by the Senate cannot honestly be characterized as 
“mere approval of or acquiescence in the initiatives” of the 
USADA.225 
D. The Entwinement Theory 
For many of the same reasons, state action could be found under 
the “entwinement” theory.226 In addition, recent bills such as the 
Clean Sports Act, which would require professional sports leagues to 
consult with the USADA in implementing drug testing and 
adjudication procedures,227 indicate that federal interaction with the 
agency is extending well beyond the BALCO scandal. The benefit of 
the entwinement theory for the plaintiff—athlete is that unfavorable 
elements of the Blum Trilogy tests, for example, the exclusivity 
 
 222. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text. 
 224. Cf. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 547 n.29 (“The SFAA has failed to 
demonstrate that the Federal Government can or does exert any influence over the exercise of 
the USOC’s enforcement decisions.”). After documentary evidence from the BALCO 
investigation led sprinter Alvin Harrison to accept a four-year suspension for drug violations 
(despite the absence of a positive test), USADA CEO Terry Madden stated that the agency was 
“thankful for the steadfast support of . . . the U.S. Senate . . . .” See Press Release, supra note 
75. In answering the question of “whether the State provided a mantle of authority that 
enhanced the power of the harm-causing individual,” the Tarkanian Court noted that “[t]he 
NCAA enjoyed no governmental powers to facilitate its investigation.” NCAA v. Tarkanian, 
488 U.S. 179, 197 (1988). Given the USADA’s relationship with the Senate, this framework of 
analysis could reveal state action. 
 225. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 547. It should be noted that significant 
government funding of the USADA, even if used in BALCO cases, would not amount to more 
than “mere approval of or acquiescence in” those cases. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 
U.S. at 544 (“The Government may subsidize private entities without assuming constitutional 
responsibility for their actions.”); Shipley, BALCO Tab, supra note 22 (outlining USADA 
funding). 
 226. See supra Part III.C. 
 227. S. 1114 § 4(b), 109th Cong. (2005). 
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requirement,228 will not preclude a finding of government action.229 
The Brentwood Academy Court indicated that it would focus on 
substance over form.230 Some view the Brentwood Academy 
entwinement theory as an alarming expansion of traditional state 
action analysis.231 However, it is not clear that a fact-specific, 
totality-of-contacts inquiry confers any extra advantage on a plaintiff 
seeking to classify the USADA as a state actor. Significant 
integration with the government exists with regard to the use of non-
analytical positives in doping adjudications,232 but the facts as a 
whole may not rise to the level of “overlapping identities” or 
“pervasive entwinement.”233 The ambiguity of the Brentwood 
Academy analysis both benefits and burdens the plaintiff in this 
hypothetical case. On the whole, however, the state action doctrine 
articulated by the Supreme Court leads one to conclude that the 
USADA is a state actor. 
CONCLUSION 
The concept of fair play is central to both the “spirit of sport” and 
due process.234 The use of illicit substances to enhance athletic 
performance is offensive to this concept.235 By the same token, 
however, the government should not be allowed to enhance the 
 
 228. See supra Part IV.A. 
 229. “[T]he facts justify a conclusion of state action under the criterion of entwinement, a 
conclusion in no sense unsettled merely because other criteria of state action may not be 
satisfied by the same facts.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 
U.S. 288, 302 (2001). 
 230. “Entwinement will support a conclusion that an ostensibly private organization ought 
to be charged with a public character and judged by constitutional standards . . . .” Id. 
 231. See Cooper, supra note 143, at 991 (describing the entwinement test as “overly 
inclusive” and as “provid[ing] attorneys with judicially acceptable means of circumventing 
traditionally rigid state action analyses”). 
 232. See supra Part IV.B–C. 
 233. The Brentwood Academy majority held that “the relevant facts show pervasive 
entwinement to the point of largely overlapping identity.” Brentwood Acad., 531 U.S. at 303. 
Justice Thomas observed that “[b]ecause the majority never defines ‘entwinement,’ the scope of 
its holding is unclear.” Id. at 314 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 234. See Mayes, supra note 124, at 154 (“[T]he two ideals which seem to conflict—due 
process and sportsmanship—are manifestations of the same core value: fair play.”). 
 235. “[D]oping is contrary to the values of sport and the principles for which it stands: fair 
play, equal chances, [and] loyal competition. . . .” Rigozzi et al., supra note 113, at 42. 
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prosecutorial performance of the USADA without applying standards 
of due process, a parallel form of fair play. It is clear that doping is 
fundamentally wrong.236 However, the USADA undermines the 
integrity of its fight against doping by taking advantage of a 
nominally private character and an inadequate standard of proof.237 A 
level playing field will be achieved only when the USADA is 
classified as a state actor and held to the constitutional standards of 
due process. 
 
 236. Id. at 42–43 (discussing both moral and medical problems created by doping). 
 237. “[T]o have full legitimacy and credibility and to satisfy notions of fundamental 
fairness, the . . . doping control process should possess a high level of procedural due process 
protection . . . .” Straubel, supra note 7, at 545; see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970) (“It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of 
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”). 
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